To Lose a Battle, by Alistair Horne (the author of A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962) is (1) a logistics-heavy description of the Battle of France, (2) a description of the general incompetence in both the France and German High Commands, (3) a tale of France, a country that was not then and never became a western democracy, and (4) a history of the end of France and Germany as distinct states.
1. The Logistics of War
“It was time that was the vital element which — more than weapons, even perhaps more than morale — France most lacked in 1940.”
Horne’s focus on logistics, timing, supplies, and materiel is refreshing, especially given so much strategy-focused writing by John Boyd and William Lind. I am not in a position to evaluate the completeness of Horne’s account, but his manner of writing certainly has fans:
Some two years later, I encountered at a London publishing party Israel’s leading military analyst and former Chief of Intelligence, Chaim Herzog (He was later to become Israel’s President.) We had met some years previously in Israel, and he had now just published his own account of the 1973 campaign, The War of Atonement. (Weidenfeld, 1975). When I commented on the similarities to the Manstein Plan of 1940, he smiled knowingly and said something to the effect that, only recently, General Sharon had referred to it, acknowledging a certain indebtedness to To Lose a Battle. Herzog kindly signed a copy of his book for me, adding the laconic but meaningful inscription, “In appreciation.”
I’ve never read a clearer account of battle that focused on the vital appointment of having the right materiel at the right location at the right time. Horne deserves major props for this part of the book, as he does for flowing between the political and military dimensions of struggle in his last book.
2. The Incompetence of the High Commands
Poor decisions went up to the part. “During the course of the Second World War,” Horne writes, “Hitler committed half a dozen key blunders that were to lose Germany the war.” Though in fairness, Hitler’s consistent habit was to bluff as much as he can while being prepared to rapidly ceed ground at the first resistance. Even as late as 1939 Horne believes that a French attack on Germany (during the Nazi invasion of Poland) would have reached the Rhine within two weeks.
The French and German general staffs, however, were fixated on the strategy of an orderly defense, and as such both were hesitant to move rapidly or seize the initiative. These “wrong lessons learned” for World War I, however, reach comic levels with the French, who even move troops away from Paris and towards the Maginot Line near the end of the fight.
3. France, an Unstable Democracy
The best insight I have from reading To Lose a Battle and A Savage War of Peace is that France was never a stable western democracy. Attempts to view its behavior as analogous to what the United States or Britain would do in a similar situation are unfounded, because France had a unique set of interests. Specific elements of French political life that made normal politics impossible were
- A lack of separation between the political and the military
- A militant left-wing (which was purposefully crippled by Stalin)
- A revolutionary right-wing (which was sympathetic to military coups against elected governments)
The pattern of both To Lose a Battle and A Savage War of Peace is the old general, brought in from retirement, who oversees the death of the old Republic and faces resistance from an idealistic general
Philippe Petain v. the Third Republic and Charles DeGaulle
but then… DeGaulle v. the Fourth Republic and Roaul Salan
After reading both books, the solution is obvious: France is not a stable democracy.
Reading To Lose a Battle and A Savage War of Peace at first is strange, because the country appears to be a nightmarish version of the United States, but the U.S. is a democracy that has not had a new constitution since the the 18th century. France, by contrast, was never stable. Thus Petain, and DeGaulle, operated out the same frame: no stable government existed absent a strong leader, so a constitutional dictatorship was (for the time being) the only natural form of government for France.
The difference between Petain and DeGaulle was not between traitor and patriot (by our standards, they were surely both). Indeed, both recognized the unstable nature of French democracy, and sought to meld the French polity into Germany. Likewise, both (like Mao Zedong, Chiang Kaishek, and Wang Jingwei) differentiated between ‘diseases of the limbs’ and ‘diseases of the hearts’ — during their heights…
- Wang Jingwei was willing to give up Taiwan, Manchuria, and Mongolia
- Mao Zedong was willing to give up Taiwan and Mongolia
- Chiang Kaishek was willing to give up Taiwan and Manchuria
- Philippe Petain was willing to give up Alsace-Lorraine and the Jews
- Charles DeGaulle was willin to give up Algeria, the Blackfeet, and the Muslims
DeGaulle, unlike Petain, was an optimist as DeGaulle, unlike Petain, did not live with the guilt of overseeing a massacre. While other French commanders fled he attacked the Germans, achieving some pointless victories that did nothing to stop the German war machine. Thus, DeGaulle was willing to wait for a better time to commit his ethnic cleansing campaign and tie his country’s fate to Germany. Petain simply wanted to end the destruction of his country.
4. The End of France and Germany
The hosts of heaven allowed the sons of man to form two nations, France and Germany, in June 840. The mandate was revoked in June, 1940.
Before France and Germany western Europe was controlled by a transnational aristocracy. After June, 1940, such a world returned.
The end of the book has a “where are they now” section. There seemed to be no correlation between the side of a leader and how his future career unfolded. Both German and French generals suffered under Hitler. Both German and French generals were executed post-war. Both German and French generals would enjoy a sunny career in NATO. June 1940 appeared to be the last month where the fates of Germany and France were, truly, antagonistic.
For centuries it was impossible imagine a world without these two countries. Now, it is impossible to imagine one with them. Considering the inability of either France or Germany to establish stable national democracies, the accomplishments of the European Union are astounding.
To Lose a Battle is a brilliant history of one of the first fights of the Second World War. Highly recommended!
Sounds like a good one to read.
Am I, though, the only one struck by the irony that Taiwan- the part of China all three sides were willing to give up- is now the center of international tension over whether it’ll formally rejoin?
Excellent review and analysis of what is now on my to read list. Currently reading Andrew Roberts The Storm of War, where he comes to the same conclusions of incompetence of generalship on both sides in the opening months. Horne’s book finds itself among the scores of sources Roberts relied upon. http://www.amazon.com/Storm-War-History-Second-ebook/dp/B002RI91SU
Lost opportunities began even as early as March 7, 1936 when Germany sent troops into the demilitarized Rhineland and France and Britain, paralized with guilt about the peace imposed on Germany failed to act. Information uncovered after the war, showed that German forces were to retreat of opposed by any force. This would have led to Hitler losing the Chancellorship and perhaps avoiding the war. Same after the war started, France immediatly marched 15 miles into Germany only to retreat after waiting five days.
Interesting observations about France’s democracy. There’s a good deal of IR literature on the relationship between security policies and democratic governance and the consensus seems to be that if you have to keep a lot of ground forces around to defend an instable border it is a threat to democracy.
For this reason, it makes since that the only way to build a sustainable democracy in either France or Germany was to erase the border and by extension erase the need for a large land army. Today, Germany seems to be leaning towards developing a self-defense force as opposed to a true expeditionary military and France seems to be focused on becoming a naval power in the Mediterranean (see: Libya); either course should be compatible with democracy.
In a similar vein, it is doubtful that Asia will know peace until the borders between Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are erased. Let’s just hope it doesn’t take a WWII level event to accomplish the task.
Our forefather’s insistence on continental hegemony for the United State looks wiser and wiser with each passing decade.
The scary thing about Pakistan vs. Taiwan and China is that Pakistan doesn’t have a large and influential elite that has a vested interest in making sure that the war doesn’t happen.
As far as I can tell, both Taiwan and China have achieved some level of effective poly-archy, with business, military and government interest groups all jockeying for policy positions. Obviously, the business leaders in both Taiwan and China are pushing hard towards greater connectivity vs. confrontation.
Geography plays a role, of course. To invade Taiwan is to assume a huge tactical risk. Simply put, the operation has a fairly high chance of just failing, and such a public failure could cause the CCP to collapse.
This makes the status quo inherently stable.
Pakistan’s geography is very different. They are surrounded on two sides by hostile powers who can fairly easily infiltrate saboteurs or insurgents into Pakistan. This has led Pakistan to evolve a deep-state security apparatus that operates independent of the elected government. If China and Taiwan are both poly-archies, then Pakistan is a mono-archy, with a single elite group – the security services – controlling the agenda.
This leads Pakistan to pursue the most reckless and ruthless foreign policy of any country in the world – save perhaps North Korea. So on one hand Pakistan is far more destabilizing then the China/Taiwan situation, because Pakistan exists in a constant state of war, unlike Taiwan and China that currently exist in peace.
Pakistan is far more likely to generate a “bolt from the blue” that could physically disrupt globalization. For example, Pakistan might one day destroy some Indian cities with nuclear weapons. That Pakistan will eventually create another situation on the scale of at least 9/11 in either India, the U.S. or the E.U. is to me not a question of if but when.
The good news is that Pakistan is unlikely to be able to pit any key pillars of globalization against one another. When push comes to shove, China can and will walk away from Pakistan a lot quicker and easier then the U.S. could walk away from Taiwan.
Also, a joint Indian/U.S/Russian/Chinese operation to take Pakistan apart would be a lot less destabilizing then a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The attack on Taiwan leads to a nuclear Japan and a Japan-South Korean-Indian alliance to contain China.
An attack on Pakistan leads only to a lot of dead Pakistanis and perhaps some canceled or delayed Chinese infrastructure projects, the value of which would be eclipsed many times over by the value of trade between China and all the other belligerents.